Does bank efficiency influence the cost of credit? by Shamshur, Anastasiya & Weill, Laurent
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Shamshur, A. and Weill, L.  (2019) Does bank efficiency influence the cost of credit?   Journal
of Banking and Finance, 105 .   pp. 62-73.  ISSN 0378-4266.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.05.002




   
 
 1 






University of East Anglia and CERGE-EI 
 
Laurent Weill* 





Using a large sample of firms from nine European countries, this study examines the 
relationship between bank efficiency and the cost of credit for borrowing firms. We 
hypothesize that bank efficiency – the ability of banks to operate at lower costs – is 
associated with lower loan rates and thus lower cost of credit. Combining firm-level and 
bank-level data, we find support for this prediction. The effect of bank efficiency on the 
cost of credit varies with firm and bank size. Bank efficiency reduces the cost of credit 
for SMEs, but does not exert a significant influence for either micro companies or large 
firms. Furthermore, the effect is driven by large banks, where improvements in bank 
efficiency tend to be strongly associated with lower cost of credit. We also find that lower 
bank competition facilitates the transmission of greater bank efficiency to lower cost of 
credit. Overall, our results indicate that measures that increase bank efficiency can foster 
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Cost efficiency of banks is a broad measure of bank performance that has 
frequently been utilized in empirical banking literature over the last two decades. It 
measures the ability of a bank to operate at lower cost by comparing its cost structure to 
that of a best-practice bank. A vast literature on bank efficiency has focused on 
measuring the level and determinants of bank efficiency around the world,2 with the goal 
of improving the performance of financial institutions.3  
Surprisingly, while the determinants of bank efficiency have been systematically 
explored, the consequences of bank efficiency have received much less attention. 
Exceptions are papers focusing on the impact of bank efficiency on financial stability (for 
example, Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Roman et al., 2016), economic growth (Lucchetti, 
Papi and Zazzaro, 2001; Hasan, Koetter and Wedow, 2009) and the transmission of 
monetary policy (Havranek, Irsova and Lesanovska, 2016). One important omission from 
this list is the effect of bank efficiency on the cost of credit. This omission is rather 
surprising, because economic theory naturally predicts that a greater ability of banks to 
operate at a lower marginal cost should be associated with lower “prices” – lower loan 
rates – and thus lower cost of credit. If correct, this argument would imply that a key 
instrument for facilitating firms’ access to credit is to improve bank efficiency. 
This paper aims to fill a gap in the literature by investigating how bank efficiency 
affects the cost of credit in nine Western European countries. A major challenge in 
analyzing this impact is obtaining firm-level information on lending banks so that 
efficiency at the bank level and cost of credit at the firm level can be linked. The last 
wave of the Amadeus database provides such information, allowing us to identify which 
banks lend to each borrowing firm. Thus, we can combine firm-level data from the 
Amadeus database with bank-level data from the Bankscope database to build a large 
sample of 240,000 firms from nine European countries. 
 
2 See, for instance, Berger, Hasan and Zhou (2009) on China, Fuji, Managi and Matousek (2014) on India, 
and Goddard, Molyneux and Williams (2014) on Latin America. 
3 For instance, Altunbas, Evans and Molyneux (2001) and Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel (2005) focus on the 
effects of ownership structure, Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) on the role of capital structure, and 
Barth et al. (2013) on the impact of bank regulation. 
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To perform our investigation, we model cost of credit as a function of bank 
efficiency and a set of firm- and country-specific control variables. We measure bank 
efficiency with a stochastic frontier approach commonly used in works on the banking 
industry (such as Lensink, Meesters and Naaborg, 2008; Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 2009). 
We use different specifications of the stochastic frontier approach designed for a cross-
country analysis, by testing the influence of country-specific variables and controlling for 
the environmental conditions in the frontier. We also investigate whether the effect of 
bank efficiency on the cost of credit is contingent on firm size, bank competition, and 
bank size, and perform several checks to examine the robustness of our results to 
different specifications of key variables and sub-samples.  
We face two key challenges in our investigation. First, while we can identify the 
lending banks for each firm, we do not have information on the share of each bank in the 
loans to the company. Therefore, we must assign each bank an equal weight in its 
importance for a firm. This is a limitation, but we address it by conducting additional 
estimations on the sub-sample of firms that use only one bank, for which therefore this 
problem does not exist. One-bank firms represent about 40% of the sample and thus 
provide a large enough sample to perform alternative estimations. 
Second, measuring the cost of credit at firm level is difficult. Information on 
individual loans can be found in credit registries but is limited to single-country datasets, 
or it can be obtained for large loans in a cross-country framework. These data sources are 
problematic if one wishes, as we do, to analyze the cost of credit in a number of countries 
for a wide spectrum of firm size. To overcome these challenges, we therefore measure the 
cost of credit by calculating the ratio of interest expenses to total bank debt using firm-
level data. This indicator, measuring the implicit interest rate charged by banks, has also 
been used by Carbo-Valverde, Rodriguez-Fernandez and Udell (2009) and Fungacova, 
Shamshur and Weill (2017). 
Our paper contributes to two debates in the literature. Firstly, we augment the vast 
literature on bank efficiency by investigating the impact of the cost efficiency of banks on 
the cost of credit for firms. Secondly, we improve our understanding of how bank 
behavior shapes access to credit. Several studies have investigated how bank competition 
and concentration influence access to credit (for example, Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and 
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Maksimovic, 2004); our work departs significantly from the existing empirical literature 
by focusing on the role of bank efficiency. 
This work has important implications. From a normative perspective, the finding 
that greater efficiency reduces cost of credit provides support for policies aimed at 
improving bank efficiency. From a positive perspective, our findings help to explain 
differences observed in the cost of credit across European countries. Our results also 
suggest that convergence in cost efficiency across European countries would facilitate 
convergence in the cost of credit for firms. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the data; Section 3 explains the 





To study whether bank efficiency affects the cost of credit for firms, both firm-level 
data and bank-level data need to be collected. The firm-level data come from the 
Amadeus database provided by Bureau van Dijk, which contains comprehensive financial 
information on public and private companies across Europe. The vast majority of firms in 
Amadeus report unconsolidated financial statements; consolidated statements are 
provided mainly by large companies only. In our dataset, we use unconsolidated financial 
statements, to avoid double counting firms and subsidiaries or operations abroad, and 
exclude firms that report only consolidated statements. We exclude firms operating in the 
financial intermediation sector and insurance industries (NACE codes 64‒66), because 
they have a different liability structure and cannot be similarly taken into account in our 
investigation explaining the cost of credit. 
The bank-level data used to compute bank efficiency come from the Bankscope 
database. We further match bank-level information to firm-level information by taking 
advantage of the recent Amadeus update, which includes information about lending 
banks for each firm. We link both databases by carefully checking the identity of lending 
banks and matching it to banks available in Bankscope.  
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We focus on nine ‘old’ EU member countries for our investigation, since they 
represent a consistent sample of developed countries without the specific characteristics 
of the more recent EU members. The newer EU countries are former or still transitioning 
economies with specific populations of firms and particular banking sector features, for 
example a substantial market share of foreign banks, which can both raise the cost of and 
impede access to credit.  
Firm-level information on the lending banks is available for nine old EU countries: 
Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom. We have a cross-section of firms for 2015, since information on the 
lending banks is only available for the last wave of Amadeus. 
The key firm-level variable is Cost of credit. It is defined as the difference between 
the ratio of financial expenses divided by bank debt and the country’s nominal short-term 
interest rate, where bank debt is the sum of short-term bank debt (“loans”) and long-term 
bank debt (“long-term debt”). This measure of the implicit interest rate, which accords 
with Carbo-Valverde, Rodriguez-Fernandez and Udell (2009),4 has been used to measure 
cost of credit by Fungacova, Shamshur and Weill (2017). It captures the cost of credit 
well, because the vast majority of our sample consists of micro and small enterprises that 
lack access to non-bank funding sources, so their financial expenses are mainly loan 
expenses. 
We consider two firm-level control variables taken from the literature. The first is 
Firm size, measured as the log of total assets, as firms of different size can differ in their 
financing patterns. The second is Tangibility, defined as the ratio of tangible fixed assets 
to total assets. A greater share of tangible fixed assets that could serve as collateral can 
contribute to easier access to credit. 
To check whether the impact of bank efficiency on the cost of credit is influenced 
by firm size, we separately consider micro firms (that is, firms with fewer than ten 
employees or a turnover or total assets of less than 2 million euros), small and medium-
sized firms (either fewer than 250 employees or a turnover of less than 50 million euros 
 
4 Carbo-Valverde, Rodriguez-Fernandez and Udell (2009) compute the loan interest spread as the 
difference between the ratio of loan expenses to bank loans outstanding and the interbank interest rate. 
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or balance sheet total of less than 43 million euros), and large firms.5 Micro firms (30 %), 
and small and medium-sized firms (67 %) together represent 97 % of the entire sample. 
We consider four country-specific control variables. We control for banking 
development, with Private credit defined as the ratio of private credit by deposit money 
banks and other financial institutions to GDP, collected from the Global Financial 
Development Database. GDP per capita and Inflation take into account macroeconomic 
conditions and are both extracted from the World Development Indicators. Rule of law 
measures institutional quality and comes from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
After excluding observations for which firm-level information or the identity of the 
lending bank(s) are not available, we have a sample of 377,925 firm-bank observations 
for about 240,000 firms. Descriptive statistics of all variables are presented in Table 1. 
Table 2 reports the number of banks per firm in the sample. The vast majority of firms 
use only a few banks: 40.6% of firms have only one bank, while 82.05% of firms have no 




3.1 Bank efficiency  
Cost efficiency measures the difference between a bank’s actual cost and its optimal 
cost for producing the same bundle of outputs. This difference then provides information 
on inefficiencies in the production process and on the optimality of the chosen mix of 
inputs. To estimate cost efficiency scores, we use a stochastic frontier approach, a 
technique that has been widely used in studies on banking efficiency (for example, 
Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel, 2005; Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 2009). It decomposes the 
distance from the efficiency frontier into an inefficiency term and a random error, which 
represents random disturbances reflecting luck or measurement errors. We assume a 
normal distribution for the random error and a half-normal distribution for the 
inefficiency term. Following Jondrow et al. (1982), bank-specific estimates of 
inefficiency terms can then be calculated using the distribution of the inefficiency term 
 
5 This classification is employed by the European Commission. For further details see 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/structural-business-statistics/structural-business-statistics/sme 
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conditional on the estimate of the composite error term (namely, the sum of the 
inefficiency term and the random error). 
We adopt the intermediation approach for the specification of banking inputs and 
outputs. This approach assumes that the bank collects deposits to transform them into 
loans with capital and labor. We consider two outputs in the cost function: loans and 
investment assets. We also employ three input prices. The price of funds is calculated as 
the interest rate paid on borrowed funds, the price of labor is defined as personnel 
expenses divided by total assets, and the price of physical capital is calculated as the ratio 
of other operating expenses to fixed assets. Total cost is the sum of the costs incurred for 
borrowed funds, labor, and physical capital. We employ the commonly-used translog 
form to model the cost frontier of banks. The cost frontier model we estimate is then 
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where TC is total cost, ym is the m
th bank’s output (m = 1, 2), wn is the n
th input price (n = 
1, 2), w3 is the price of borrowed funds, u the inefficiency term, and v the random error. 
For simplicity of presentation, the indices for each bank have been dropped. 
Homogeneity conditions are imposed by normalizing total costs, price of labor and price 
of physical capital, by the price of borrowed funds. 
Given the cross-country nature of our sample, the inclusion of country-level 
variables in the frontier function could be important. Many cross-country studies on bank 
efficiency have estimated a common frontier, pooling all banks without including 
country-level variables (for example, Casu and Girardone, 2006; Fiordelisi, Marques-
Ibanez and Molyneux, 2011). However, Lozano-Vivas, Pastor and Pastor (2002) have 
pointed out that the omission of country-level variables in the estimation of the frontier 
leads to a misinterpretation of the cross-country differences in efficiency. These can be 
attributed to differences in managerial performance, but they can also result from 
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variations in environmental characteristics. For instance, a bank may benefit from a 
greater income per capita in a country, which would contribute to higher bank outputs for 
exogenous reasons. Consequently, they conclude that estimating a common frontier 
without considering environmental conditions “is not able to compare the different 
banking systems on an equal footing” (Lozano-Vivas, Pastor and Pastor, 2002, p.73). 
Therefore, a number of cross-country works on bank efficiency have followed this 
paper by including country-level variables in the estimation of the frontier, to provide a 
relevant analysis of cross-country differences in efficiency in Europe (for example, 
Lensink, Meesters and Naaborg, 2008; Hasan, Koetter and Wedow, 2009). 
In our study, we focus on the relationship between bank efficiency and the cost of 
credit and, therefore, are not primarily interested in the causes of inefficiencies. Our 
hypothesis is that a more efficient bank can provide cheaper loans to its customers, 
irrespective of whether that efficiency is related to better managerial performance or 
better environment. Nonetheless, the frequent inclusion of country-level variables in the 
estimation of efficiency frontiers motivates us to test different specifications, so that we 
assess the sensitivity of our findings to this choice. 
We therefore estimate efficiency scores using three alternative specifications for the 
cost frontier. Firstly, we estimate a common frontier without country-level variables. 
With this specification, efficiency scores measure the cost performance of each bank to a 
common frontier for all countries, and do not account for the environmental differences 
across countries. Secondly, we estimate a common frontier including country fixed 
effects to control for cross-country differences. Thirdly, a common frontier is estimated 
with country-level variables. We consider four country-level variables that have been 
used in former works estimating common frontiers with environmental variables (for 
example, Lozano-Vivas, Pastor and Pastor, 2002; Hasan, Koetter and Wedow, 2009). 
These are the same country-level variables included in some of our regressions 
explaining cost of credit. With both the latter specifications, efficiency scores measure 
the cost performance of each bank relative to a common frontier for all countries, taking 
into account environmental differences across countries. 
The descriptive statistics for the three types of efficiency scores are reported for the 
full sample in Table 1. We observe that average bank efficiencies are of the same order of 
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magnitude, with respectively 73.8%, 75.7%, and 74.5% for the frontiers without country 
controls, with country fixed effects, and with country control variables. Rank-order 
correlations among the different cost efficiency measures are positive and statistically 
significant. Specifically, the correlation coefficients range from 0.8964 to 0.9837 and are 
all significant at the 1% level. Given the high rank-order correlation among the cost 
efficiency measures, we only report the estimations employing the efficiency scores 
based on the frontier with country control variables. The only exception is our main 
estimations, where we use all three cost efficiency measures to ensure the robustness of 
our results across cost efficiency score specifications. 
Table 3 presents the mean efficiency scores by country, while Table 4 reports the 
efficiency scores by bank size and by bank ownership. 
 
3.2 Econometric specifications 
To analyze the relationship between bank efficiency and cost of credit, we run 
regressions of cost of credit on the efficiency score and a set of control variables: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗 + 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗, (2) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗 is the cost of bank credit for firm i in country j; X is a set of firm-specific 
variables (Firm size, Tangibility); Z is a set of country-level variables (Private credit, 
Rule of law, GDP per capita, Inflation); Efficiency is the measure of bank efficiency, and 
ε is a random error term. We also include industry fixed effects in the estimations to 
control for the influence of the industry on the cost of credit. We estimate the equation 
(2) by including either country fixed effects or a set of country-level variables, so that we 
test the robustness of our findings to different specifications. 
The endogeneity problem is greatly reduced in our setting for the empirical 
investigation since bank efficiency is computed at the bank level, while cost of credit is 
firm-level information obtained from a different data source. It is therefore unlikely that 
the cost of credit can exert an impact on bank efficiency. Nonetheless, we later test 
whether our results could be driven by potential endogeneity. 
 
4. Results 




4.1 Main estimations 
Table 5 reports the results of the main estimations. We consider six different 
specifications based on the choice of the efficiency frontier and the inclusion of country 
control variables or country fixed effects. 
We find that Bank efficiency is negatively related to the cost of credit. The 
estimated coefficient is significant in four specifications out of six tested. Therefore, our 
main conclusion is that bank efficiency has a negative influence on cost of credit. In other 
words, our findings support the view that higher bank efficiency is associated with the 
lower cost of credit. This is in line with the idea that the benefits of banks’ ability to 
minimize costs are transferred to borrowers through the cost of credit. Thus, our findings 
are of particular importance to policymakers who aim to design policies improving access 
to credit. Specifically, fostering bank efficiency could play an important role in the 
financing of the economy as a whole.  
The estimated coefficients of the firm-level control variables have the expected 
sign. Size is negatively related to cost of credit, which is consistent with the view that 
larger firms enjoy lower credit costs. Furthermore, Tangibility is negative, as the greater 
tangibility of assets provides more collateral and therefore contributes to reducing the 
cost of credit. When including country-level control variables, we point out that both 
Private Credit and GDP per capita have a negative impact on the cost of credit. These 
findings accord with the view that greater financial and economic development is 
associated with lower cost of credit, due to lower information asymmetries (Godlewski 
and Weill, 2011). Rule of law is positive, which contrasts with the expectation that a 
better institutional framework would reduce the cost of credit, while Inflation is negative. 
It must however be stressed that our sample is a cross-section of firms from nine 
countries. As such, country-level variables intend to control for the influence of the 
country-specific environment on the cost of credit, but should not be used to draw general 
conclusions on the relation between country variables and the cost of credit. 
 
4.2 Estimations by firm size 
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Our main results show that bank efficiency exerts a negative influence on the cost 
of credit. We further investigate whether the effect of bank efficiency on the cost of credit 
varies with the size of a firm. This issue is of utmost interest, since small firms are 
particularly affected by limited access to credit and have been shown to suffer the most 
from higher loan rates charged by banks.6 We therefore investigate whether higher bank 
efficiency is associated with the lower cost of credit for all types of firms. 
We re-estimate our regressions by considering separately the following groups of 
firms: micro companies, SMEs, and large companies. The results are reported in Table 6. 
Overall the results on the relationship between bank efficiency and cost of credit are 
consistent across the tested efficiency frontiers.7 
We find that bank efficiency is not significant for micro enterprises and for large 
companies. However, bank efficiency is significantly negative for SMEs in one of the 
two specifications tested. We therefore support the view that the negative impact of bank 
efficiency on cost of credit is only observed for SMEs, while no relation can be found 
either for micro enterprises or for large companies. 
The implications of these results are then straightforward. Greater bank efficiency 
can be beneficial for SMEs. It does not seem to facilitate access to credit through lower 
costs for micro enterprises or large companies. While large firms can rely on other 
sources of financing, the design of policies to enhance bank efficiency would not foster 
access to credit for all firms suffering from high loan rates. Still, we show that greater 
bank efficiency can facilitate access to credit for SMEs, even if micro enterprises do not 
benefit from this. 
 
4.3 The effect of competition 
We demonstrate that higher bank efficiency benefits firms by reducing their 
borrowing costs. This transmission of bank efficiency into credit costs could potentially 
be affected by competition in the banking sector. Building on the competition literature, 
 
6 Based on a survey on managers mostly from small companies, Beck et al. (2006, p.938) show that “high 
interest rates” is the main financing obstacle for firms all around the world. 
7 While we only report the results for the cost efficiency with country variables, the results using the 
alternative cost efficiency specifications (with no country controls and country fixed effects) are available 
upon request. 
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we consider how competition moderates the relationship between bank efficiency and the 
cost of credit. 
There are two opposing views concerning the relationship between bank 
competition and cost of credit – the market power hypothesis and the information 
hypothesis. The market power hypothesis suggests that greater bank competition would 
lead to lower loan rates (Sapienza, 2002; Kim et al., 2005; Degryse and Ongena, 2005). 
As more efficient banks have lower costs than their less efficient competitors, they would 
be able to offer lower loan rates to borrowing firms than less efficient banks under this 
hypothesis. 
In contrast, the information hypothesis stresses the importance of collecting soft 
information about borrowing firms. Greater bank competition decreases bank incentives 
to invest in soft information and consequently increases the cost of credit for firms 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Fungacova, Shamshur and Weill, 2017). More efficient banks, 
it is argued, have a comparative advantage in technologies like relationship lending that 
are based primarily on extracting value from soft information (Berger, 2007). Therefore, 
under the information hypothesis, higher competition would cause a disadvantage in 
relationship lending for more efficient banks and force them to charge higher loan rates 
compared to less efficient banks. 
We use the Lerner index to measure bank competition. The advantage of using this 
measure is that it directly quantifies the competitive behavior of each bank without 
inferring it from indirect proxies such as market share. The Lerner index is defined as the 
difference between price and marginal cost, divided by price. Following Carbo-Valverde, 
Rodriguez-Fernandez and Udell (2009), price is the average price of bank production 
(proxied by total assets) and is defined as the ratio of total revenues to total assets. The 
marginal cost is estimated on the basis of a translog cost function with one output (total 
assets) and the same three input prices (price of labor, price of physical capital, and price 
of borrowed funds) used for the estimation of cost efficiency scores. 
We estimate the Lerner index for each bank for five years and then use the five-
year average as a measure of bank competition. This is in line with Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (2004) and Claessens and Laeven (2005) among others, who also adopt 
average measures of bank competition. In our case, this approach also allows us to reduce 
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the potential correlation between the Lerner index and bank efficiency. The correlation 
coefficients for the Lerner index averaged over five years and the three efficiency 
measures range from 0.15 to 0.18.8 
The effect of bank competition on the cost of credit is captured by including the 
Lerner index and the interaction term between the Lerner index and bank efficiency in 
our main specifications. The coefficient for the Lerner index represents the direct effect 
of competition on the cost of credit. The coefficient for the interaction term shows how 
the relationship between bank efficiency and the cost of credit is moderated by 
competition. We present the results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 7. As the estimated 
direct effect of the Lerner index on the cost of credit is positive and significant, higher 
competition is associated with the lower cost of credit. The total effect of the competition 
on the cost of credit, however, is the sum of the coefficient for the Lerner index and the 
coefficient for the interaction term Bank efficiency × Lerner index, multiplied by the 
value of Bank efficiency. Thus, the overall effect of the Lerner index on the cost of credit 
is positive when efficiency is low but it decreases gradually as bank efficiency increases. 
Then, the overall impact of the Lerner index on the cost of credit is negative when bank 
efficiency exceeds 65.5% and 70.2%, depending on the specification. The mean value of 
bank efficiency scores, for comparison, is 74.5%. We thus conclude that a higher Lerner 
index (lower competition) increases the cost of credit when bank efficiency is low, but 
reduces the cost of credit when bank efficiency is high. Therefore, the information 
hypothesis dominates for efficient banks, while the market power hypothesis dominates 
for inefficient banks. 
 
4.4 Estimations by bank size 
Our main estimations indicate that greater bank efficiency contributes to a lower 
cost of credit. Thus, clients of more cost-efficient banks benefit from their lower costs 
through cheaper loans. However, the literature has widely debated the optimal bank size. 
Recent studies demonstrate the potentially detrimental influence of banks that are too 
large for financial stability (Vinals et al., 2013; Laeven, Ratnovski and Tong, 2014). We 
 
8 As a robustness check, we have performed estimations using the Lerner index for the current year. Our 
results hold. These results are available upon request. 
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therefore investigate whether the transmission of bank efficiency to loan pricing varies by 
bank size.  
There are various reasons why banks of different sizes may differ in terms of 
transmission of their cost to loan prices. Firstly, banks of different sizes serve different 
clienteles. Berger et al. (2005) and Berger, Bouwman and Kim (2017) show that large 
banks grant fewer loans to small businesses. They tend to specialize in lending to larger 
companies because they can use “hard”, quantitative information obtained from audited 
financial statements. Small banks, instead, have a comparative advantage in lending to 
small companies by utilizing “soft”, qualitative information gathered over the course of a 
relationship established with a small business. Secondly, large banks also differ from 
small banks in terms of their business model. As pointed out by Laeven, Ratnovski and 
Tong (2014), a greater size allows large banks to have a broader range of activities 
resulting in greater diversification. Large banks can consequently focus on a different set 
of activities to small banks.  
To test empirically whether the effect of bank efficiency on the cost of credit differs 
for large and small banks, we create a dummy variable Large bank, which is equal to one 
if a bank belongs to the top 25% of banks in terms of assets and zero otherwise. We 
include this variable and the interaction term Bank efficiency × Large bank in the 
estimations. The interaction term captures the impact of bank size on the relationship 
between bank efficiency and cost of credit. We report the results in columns (3) and (4) 
of Table 7. We observe that the interaction term Bank efficiency × Large bank is negative 
in all estimations and significant in the specification with country-specific control 
variables. 
We therefore provide evidence that the impact of bank efficiency on the cost of 
credit is influenced by bank size. Specifically, higher efficiency in large banks 
contributes more to lower credit costs than higher efficiency in small banks. From a 
policy perspective, this conclusion suggests that gains in efficiency in large banks 
provide more benefits in terms of reduced cost of credit than those in small banks. As a 
consequence, authorities should particularly encourage efforts to improve efficiency in 
large banks. 
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4.5 Estimations by bank ownership 
The diversity of ownership structure is an important characteristic of the European 
banking industry. While commercial banks generally dominate the market in Europe, a 
non-negligible market share also belongs to cooperative and savings banks in France, 
Germany and Spain. Banks of different types are likely to have different business models 
that could affect the relationship between bank efficiency and the cost of credit. For 
example, Altunbas, Evans and Molyneux (2001) have demonstrated that bank efficiency 
can be influenced by bank ownership in Europe. 
We therefore investigate whether the relationship between bank efficiency and the 
cost of credit is moderated by bank ownership. We differentiate between five types of 
banks: (i) commercial banks, (ii) cooperative banks, (iii) savings banks, (iv) bank 
holdings and holding companies, and (v) other banks category that captures all the 
remaining bank types in our sample. Respectively, we introduce five dummy variables 
for each bank type. The main specification is then augmented to include all bank type 
dummy variables and their interactions with Bank efficiency in the estimations. The 
interaction terms capture the relationship between bank efficiency and the cost of credit 
for each type of bank relative to the omitted – other banks – category. 
The results are reported in columns (5) and (6) in Table 7. The evidence is mixed. 
On the one hand, ownership dummy variables and their interactions terms with bank 
efficiency are not significant in the estimation without country-specific control variables. 
On the other hand, we observe positive and significant coefficients for commercial banks 
and cooperative banks in the estimation with country-specific control variables. This 
latter estimation therefore provides some support to the view that the negative impact of 
bank efficiency on cost of credit would be less strong for commercial banks and 
cooperative banks than for the other types of banks. 
   
4.6 Robustness tests 
We examine the robustness of our findings in several ways.  
One-bank firms. We redo the estimations on the sub-sample of firms that use only 
one bank. A potential criticism of our investigation concerns the absence of information 
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on the breakdown of loans by bank for each firm. As a consequence, we consider all the 
banks providing loans to a firm and look at the impact of their efficiency levels on the 
cost of credit of the firm. The composition of the sample, however, is such that the vast 
majority of firms maintain relationships with a rather small number of banks, which 
reduces this potential problem. 
We can, however, allow for a clean identification, at the cost of reducing the 
sample size, by performing the estimations only for firms with one bank. These firms 
represent about 40% of the observations in our sample, so they provide a sample large 
enough to generate relevant estimations. These estimations are displayed in columns (1) 
and (2) of Table 8. We observe a significantly negative coefficient for bank efficiency in 
all estimations, meaning that greater bank efficiency is associated with the lower credit 
costs for firms. These results are not only consistent with the results obtained on the full 
sample, but also, as expected, stronger – the estimated coefficient is negative and 
significant in both specifications. 
Alternative measure for the cost of credit. Following Fungacova, Shamshur and 
Weill (2017), we redefine the cost of credit as interest paid divided by total debt, since 
information on interest paid is available in the Amadeus database for a large number of 
firms. The results are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 8. We still observe that the 
estimated coefficient of bank efficiency is negative and significant in the specification 
with country fixed effects. Therefore, these results generally align with our main 
estimations and thus provide additional support for our key finding. 
Sample composition. We perform the estimations excluding France and Spain. As 
approximately 70% of firms are located in these countries, one might wonder if our 
findings still hold when we exclude firms from these countries. The two first columns of 
Table 9 display these estimations. We note that the coefficient on bank efficiency is 
negative and significant in all estimations. Therefore, our selection of countries does not 
drive the main results. 
Profit efficiency. In our analysis we use cost efficiency as our main measure of 
bank efficiency. This choice accords with the tested hypothesis, according to which a 
greater ability of banks to operate with lower costs should be associated with lower 
banking prices, including lower cost of credit. However several studies on bank 
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efficiency have also pointed out the importance of profit efficiency, which is a broader 
concept that combines cost efficiency and revenue efficiency (e.g., Berger and Mester, 
1997; Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 2009). To be profit efficient a bank must be able to 
produce with the minimal costs (cost efficient) and with the maximal revenues (revenue 
efficient). A bank can therefore be cost efficient but not profit efficient, if it has high cost 
efficiency but low revenue efficiency. Berger and Mester (1997, p.930) provide two 
reasons why banks can have low cost efficiency and high profit efficiency: “firms with 
low cost efficiency tend to have high revenue efficiency that offsets it. This could occur 
because of competitive pressures if, for example, firms with highly valued product mixes 
or high revenue efficiency feel less market discipline to control their costs (…) An 
alternative explanation is that much of what are measured as cost inefficiencies are 
actually unmeasured differences in product quality that required additional costs to 
create.” 
To test whether the focus on profit efficiency would have different implications for 
the cost of credit, we first compute profit efficiency scores. We consider an alternative 
profit frontier following Berger, Hasan and Zhou (2009). This frontier model is similar to 
the cost frontier (see equation 1) with one change for the dependent variable. The 
dependent variable in this case is the profit (measured by net income) normalized by 
borrowed funds. As the minimum value of profit in the sample is negative, we add its 
absolute value and the unity to each observation to avoid taking a natural logarithm of 
negative number. We then estimate the alternative profit frontier including country level 
control variables since it is our preferred specification for cost efficiency scores. 
We find that the mean profit efficiency score is 0.793 (to be compared with 0.745 
for the mean cost efficiency score). We compute the Spearman rank order correlation 
between cost efficiency and profit efficiency scores: the correlation is -0.2634 and is 
significant at the 1% level. In line with Berger and Mester (1997), cost efficiency and 
profit efficiency scores are negatively correlated.  
We then estimate the relation between profit efficiency and the cost of credit in the 
last two columns of Table 9. We observe that profit efficiency is negative and significant 
in both estimations. Hence profit efficiency, similarly to cost efficiency, is negatively 
related to the cost of credit.  
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Endogeneity. A potential concern is that bank risk strategies could be driving our 
main result. For example, a very risk-averse bank that specializes in lending to low-risk 
firms will have lower loan loss expenses and may appear to be more cost efficient than 
the typical bank. It will charge lower interest rates because it is lending to clients with 
low default risks. To address this concern, we need to observe whether banks with two 
different levels of cost efficiency are lending to the same firm at different rates. Our data, 
however, does not allow for such a level of granularity.  
To strengthen a casual interpretation of our results, we opt for a matching analysis 
that allows us to compare the cost of credit of matched firms borrowing from high and 
low efficiency banks. For clean identification we focus on one-bank firms only. First, we 
split our sample into two groups by efficiency level. The top 10% of banks (high 
efficiency) form the treated group and the bottom 10% of banks (low efficiency) form the 
control group. Using a nearest neighbor matching algorithm, we find similar pairs of 
firms borrowing from banks in different efficiency groups and then compare their cost of 
credit. 
Formally, let 𝐷 = 1 if the firm borrows from a high efficiency bank and 𝐷 = 0 if 
the firm borrows from a low efficiency bank. Similarly, 𝑌1 is the cost of credit for a firm 
that borrows from a high efficiency bank and 𝑌0 is the cost of credit for a firm that 
borrows from a bank in a low efficiency group. Then an observed firm’s cost of credit is 
equal to  
𝑌 = 𝐷𝑌1 + (1 − 𝐷) 𝑌0 (3) 
The difference in the cost of credit could be attributed to the treatment effect when 
a firm is borrowing simultaneously from high and low efficiency banks, and defined as 
∆𝑌 = 𝑌1 −   𝑌0 (4) 
We only observe a firm either borrowing from the high efficiency bank (treatment 
group) or from the low efficiency bank (control group). To define the best approximation 
of the difference, we use the exact matching on industry (2-digit NACE) and conduct a 
nearest neighbor matching procedure that accounts for the similar set of firm-specific 
characteristics. We assume that banks consider firms’ asset structure when setting interest 
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rates. Specifically, we match firms on their size and tangibility.9 Table 10 Panel A 
presents the results of the matching analysis. The average effect on the treatment group is 
about -0.009 (standard error 0.002). It is highly statistically significant and robust across 
all bank efficiency measures. The sign and size of the estimated effect is also very close 
to our main estimation results reported in Table 5.  
We further assess the quality of the matching by comparing the distribution of 
baseline covariates between treatment and control groups in the matched sample (Austin 
2009, 2011). Summary statistics for matched and unmatched samples is reported in Panel 
B of Table 10. Comparability of firms borrowing from high and low efficiency banks is 
assessed using standardized differences.10 The summary statistics appear to indicate a 
good balance. Matching has significantly diminished systematic differences in means. 
For example, in the unmatched sample the absolute standardized difference for firm size 
is 0.683, while in the matched sample it is close to zero (0.002). Overall, balance is 
achieved for all covariates as they are lying within a 10% window, which has been used 
in the literature as the definition of a negligible difference (Austin, 2009). We further 
look at the diagnostic box plots (Figure 1) and the kernel density plots (Figure 2). All the 




In this paper we examine the impact of bank efficiency on the cost of credit. We 
combine firm-level data with bank-level data so that we can identify the level of 
efficiency of the banks lending money to each firm. We then perform estimations on a 
large sample of 240,000 companies from nine European countries. 
Our key finding is that higher bank efficiency is associated with lower cost of 
credit. Therefore, we support the view that banks’ effectiveness in minimizing costs is 
transferred to borrowing firms through lower costs of credit. This conclusion is robust 
 
9 Note that when matching on more than one continuous covariate, the nearest-neighbor matching estimator 
is biased. We therefore use Abadie and Imbens’ (2006, 2011) procedure to correct for this bias. 
10 The advantage of looking at the standardized difference is that, unlike t-tests commonly used to assess 
balancing, the standardized difference is not influenced by sample size (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985; 
Austin 2009). 
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using the alternative definition of the cost of credit, the alternative specifications of the 
frontier, the country sample composition, the set of control variables, and the restriction 
of the sample to one-bank firms. 
We also observe that the impact of bank efficiency on cost of credit differs with the 
size of the firm. Thus, bank efficiency diminishes the cost of credit only for SMEs. The 
relationship between bank efficiency and the cost of credit is also negative, but not 
significant for micro companies and large companies. The negative effect of bank 
efficiency on the cost of credit is mediated by the Lerner index – lower bank competition 
facilitates the transfer of greater bank efficiency to lower cost of credit. Finally, we find 
that greater cost efficiency is transmitted to lower cost of credit mainly by large banks. 
The normative implications of our findings are that taking measures to enhance the 
efficiency of banks, and in particular of large banks, could reduce the cost of credit for 
firms. Therefore, implementing policies to improve bank efficiency should facilitate 
access to credit. Literature on bank efficiency has identified a large set of determinants, 
including bank ownership and capital structure. Using these determinants, authorities can 
design policies enhancing bank efficiency so as to foster access to credit and thus 
improve the financing of the economy as a whole. 
From a positive perspective, our work can help to understand the cross-country 
differences in the cost of credit. It demonstrates that bank efficiency is one of the 
important determinants of the cost of credit and as such should be taken into account 
alongside the degree of competition or the development of banking markets. 
In addition to these implications, our results are of importance for researchers, since 
they provide a major reason to investigate the level and the determinants of bank 
efficiency. Our research is an initial step towards understanding the effects of bank 
efficiency on the cost of credit. Further work is needed to check the relevance of our 
results with alternative datasets, in particular in emerging and developing countries, 
where companies suffer the most from the high cost of credit. 
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This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimations. Firm size is the log of 
total assets in thousand USD. GDP per capita is in USD. The remaining variables are ratios. Definitions of 
all variables are provided in the Appendix. 
 
  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Firm-level variables      
Firm size 377 925 0.808 1.616 -5.036 5.048 
Tangibility 377 925 0.258 0.238 0.000 0.975 
Cost of credit 377 925 0.069 0.083 0.000 0.619 
Country-level variables      
Private credit 377 925 113.6 14.4 77.5 134.7 
Rule of law 377 925 1.104 0.337 0.242 1.935 
GDP per capita 377 925 32 301 7 462 21 969 51 258 
Inflation 377 925 -0.197 0.504 -1.736 0.897 
Bank-level variables      
Bank (cost) efficiency      
No country controls 377 925 0.738 0.071 0.135 0.969 
Country fixed effects 377 925 0.757 0.072 0.141 0.970 
Country-level controls 377 593 0.745 0.074 0.133 0.969 
Profit efficiency 377 950 0.793 0.125 0.000 0.989 









Number of banks per firm 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the number of banks used by firms. Definitions of variables are 
provided in the Appendix. 
 
Banks Frequency Percent Cumulative percent 
1 153 438 40.6 40.60 
2 84 921 22.47 63.07 
3 71 713 18.98 82.05 
4 36 615 9.69 91.73 
5 18 740 4.96 96.69 
6 8 052 2.13 98.82 
7 2 854 0.76 99.58 
8 1 027 0.27 99.85 
9 387 0.1 99.95 
10 138 0.04 99.99 
11 40 0.01 100 
Total 377 925 100  
 




Bank efficiency scores and sample composition by country 
  
This table provides the descriptive statistics for the efficiency scores estimated with a cross-country 
stochastic frontier with country variables and the number of observations, banks, and firms by country.  
 
  Country-level variables Obs. Banks Firms 
  Mean Std dev.       
Austria 0.751 0.084 3 696 238 2 143 
Germany 0.759 0.108 18 281 1 257 9 474 
Spain 0.765 0.062 183 401 180 94 933 
France 0.731 0.065 79 815 214 79 815 
United Kingdom 0.792 0.113 12 229 52 12 188 
Greece 0.590 0.029 14 848 10 6 556 
Ireland 0.828 0.111 1 674 23 1 673 
Netherlands 0.610 0.134 235 17 182 











Bank efficiency scores by size and ownership 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the efficiency scores estimated with a cross-country 
stochastic frontier with country variables. A bank is classified as Large bank if it belongs to the top 25% of 
banks in terms of total assets, otherwise it is classified as Small bank. Size classes are quantiles in total 
assets. Commercial bank, Cooperative bank, Bank holdings, Savings bank denote the respective bank 
ownership types. 
 
 Obs. Mean Std. dev. 
By size 
Small bank 289 665 0.751 0.072 
Large bank 89 934 0.727 0.080 
Size class 1st quantile 94 160 0.759 0.044 
Size class 2nd quantile 95 839 0.705 0.067 
Size class 3rd quantile 99 666 0.787 0.060 
Size class 4th quantile 89 934 0.727 0.083 
By ownership 
Commercial banks 283 211 0.745 0.077 
Cooperative banks 45 120 0.750 0.036 
Bank holdings 10 239 0.787 0.022 
Savings banks 30 094 0.738 0.061 












This table presents the results of OLS regressions examining the relation between cost of credit and bank 
efficiency. Definitions of variables are provided in the Appendix. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
  Dependent variable = Cost of credit 
  No country controls Country FEs Country-level controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Bank efficiency -0.009*** -0.003 -0.011*** -0.006*** -0.009*** 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm size -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tangibility -0.046*** -0.044*** -0.046*** -0.044*** -0.046*** -0.044*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Private credit  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Rule of law  0.019***  0.019***  0.020*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
GDP per capita  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Inflation  -0.026***  -0.026***  -0.026*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Constant 0.079*** 0.111*** 0.080*** 0.112*** 0.082*** 0.109*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
       
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes No 
       
R2 0.038 0.036 0.038 0.036 0.038 0.036 








Estimations by firm size 
 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions examining the relation between cost of credit and bank 
efficiency. Efficiency scores are estimated with a cross-country stochastic frontier with country variables. 
Definitions of variables are provided in the Appendix. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  Dependent variable = Cost of credit 
  Micro SME Large 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Bank efficiency -0.007 -0.004 -0.008*** 0.002 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.011) (0.010) 
Firm size -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.047*** -0.045*** -0.048*** -0.050*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
Private credit  -0.000  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Rule of law  0.032***  0.022***  -0.032*** 
  (0.012)  (0.002)  (0.008) 
GDP per capita  -0.000  -0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Inflation  -0.034***  -0.027***  -0.005 
  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.004) 
Constant 0.027 0.000 0.079*** 0.115*** 0.218*** 0.254*** 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) 
       
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes No 
       
R2 0.046 0.046 0.037 0.036 0.080 0.076 










Moderating effects of bank competition, bank size and bank ownership 
 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions examining the relation between cost of credit and bank 
efficiency. Efficiency scores are estimated with a cross-country stochastic frontier with country variables. 
The Lerner index is defined as the difference between price and marginal cost divided by price. Large bank 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank belongs to the top 25% of banks in terms of total assets and 
zero otherwise. Commercial bank, Cooperative bank, Bank holding, Savings bank are dummy variables 
equal to one if the bank belongs to this ownership type and zero otherwise. Definitions of variables are 
provided in the Appendix. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  Dependent variable = Cost of credit 
  
The impact of 
competition 
The impact of  
bank size 
The impact of 
bank ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (3) (5) (6) 
       
Bank efficiency -0.008** -0.0002 -0.004 0.014*** -0.007 -0.017*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) 
Lerner index 0.019** 0.040**     
 (0.005) (0.005)     
Bank efficiency ×  -0.029** -0.057**     
Lerner index (0.006) (0.006)     
Bank efficiency ×   -0.004 -0.030***   
Large bank   (0.005) (0.005)   
Large bank   0.004 0.024***   
   (0.004) (0.004)   
Bank efficiency×     0.003 0.025*** 
Commercial bank     (0.006) (0.006) 
Bank efficiency×     -0.001 0.020* 
Cooperative bank     (0.012) (0.012) 
Bank efficiency×     0.044 0.015 
Bank holding     (0.039) (0.039) 
Bank efficiency×     -0.016 0.005 
Savings bank     (0.010) (0.010) 
Commercial bank     -0.000 -0.016*** 
     (0.005) (0.004) 
Cooperative bank     -0.006 -0.024*** 
     (0.009) (0.009) 
Bank holding     -0.036 -0.013 
     (0.030) (0.031) 
Savings bank     0.009 -0.005 
     (0.007) (0.007) 
Firm size -0.002** -0.002** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
   
 
 31 
Tangibility -0.045** -0.043** -0.046*** -0.044*** -0.046*** -0.044*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Private credit  -0.001**  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Rule of law  0.025**  0.027***  0.018*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
GDP per capita  -0.000**  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Inflation  -0.030**  -0.030***  -0.025*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Constant 0.085** 0.131** 0.078*** 0.106*** 0.065*** 0.135*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.011) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes No 
R2 0.036 0.035 0.038 0.037 0.039 0.038 
N 370,438 370,081 377,950 377,593 377,949 377,592 
 
  




Robustness checks 1/2 
 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions examining the relation between cost of credit and bank 
efficiency. Efficiency scores are estimated with a cross-country stochastic frontier with country variables. 
Estimations (1) and (2) are performed on the subsample of firms with only one bank. Specifications (3) and 
(4) employ an alternative measure for the cost of credit that is the ratio of interest paid to total debt. 
Definitions of variables are provided in the Appendix. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  Dependent variable = Cost of credit 
  
One-bank relationship firms 
only  
 Alternative measure of cost 
of credit 
     
Bank efficiency -0.009*** -0.006* -0.005*** 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm size -0.000** -0.000* -0.004*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tangibility -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.031*** -0.029*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private credit  -0.000***  -0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Rule of law  0.001  0.051*** 
  (0.004)  (0.001) 
GDP per capita  -0.000  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Inflation  -0.016***  -0.036*** 
  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Constant 0.082*** 0.116*** 0.070*** 0.129*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes No Yes No 
     
R2 0.030 0.029 0.042 0.041 
N 153,465 153,109 371,593 371,240 
  




Robustness checks 2/2 
 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions examining the relation between cost of credit and bank 
efficiency. Efficiency scores are estimated with a cross-country stochastic frontier with country variables. 
Estimations (1) and (2) are performed on the sample excluding France and Spain, both countries together 
representing 70% of observations. Specifications (3) and (4) employ an alternative efficiency measure, 
specifically, profit efficiency. Definitions of variables are provided in the Appendix. Standard errors (in 
brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  Dependent variable = Cost of credit 
  Without France and Spain Profit efficiency 
     
Bank efficiency -0.008** -0.013***   
 (0.004) (0.004)   
Profit efficiency   -0.013*** -0.004*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm size -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tangibility -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.048*** -0.044*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Private credit  -0.001***  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Rule of law  0.013***  0.016*** 
  (0.005)  (0.002) 
GDP per capita  -0.000  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Inflation  -0.021***  -0.025*** 
  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Constant 0.060*** 0.132*** 0.076*** 0.113*** 
 (0.022) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes No Yes No 
     
R2 0.074 0.073 0.029 0.036 
N 114,743 114,386 377,949 377,592 
  




 Nearest Neighbor Matching: Bank Efficiency and Cost of Credit 
The table reports the results for the nearest neighbor matching procedure using one-bank firms. We split the 
sample by bank efficiency level. The top 10% of banks (high efficiency) form the treated group and the 
bottom 10% of banks (low efficiency) form the control group. We then analyze the effect of borrowing 
from high efficiency banks on the cost of credit of firms by estimating the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATT). Panel A presents matching results and Panel B provides a covariate balance summary. 
Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A. Nearest Neighbor Matching 
  Outcome variable = Cost of Credit 
 (Average Treatment Effect on Treated) 
 No country controls Country fixed effects Country-level controls 
    
Difference (Treated - Control) -0.0091*** -0.0087*** -0.0097*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
Panel B. Covariate Balance Summary 
  Standardized differences Variance ratio 
 Raw Matched Raw Matched 
     
No county controls 
Firm Size 0.683 0.002 1.163 1.022 
Tangibility 0.064 0.005 1.229 1.015 
Country fixed effects 
Firm Size 0.493 0.003 1.085 1.019 
Tangibility 0.335 0.006 1.547 1.016 
Country-level controls 
Firm Size 0.417 0.002 1.167 1.025 









Box plots of the unmatched and matched data. 
No country controls 
Firm size Tangibility 
  
Country fixed effects 
Firm size Tangibility 
  
Country-level controls 
Firm size Tangibility 
  




The kernel density plots using the unmatched and matched data. 
No country controls 
Firm size Tangibility 
  
Country fixed effects 
Firm size Tangibility 
  
Country-level controls 
Firm size Tangibility 
  





Bank efficiency Cost efficiency score. Source: own computation. 
Profit efficiency Profit efficiency score. Score: own computation. 
Firm size = log(total assets). Source: Amadeus. 
Tangibility = tangible fixed assets /total assets. Source: Amadeus. 
Cost of credit = (financial expenses /total debt) – country nominal short-term 
interest rate. Source: Amadeus and SDW. 
Lerner index Lerner index is defined as the difference between price and 
marginal cost divided by price. Source: own computation.  
Private credit Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP. Source: Global 
Financial Development Database, World Bank. 
Rule of law This variable captures the extent to which agents have confidence 
in the rule of law and how well they expect members of society to 
abide by the rules. In particular, it looks at the perceptions about 
the quality of enforcement of contract law and property rights, as 
well as the behavior of the police and the courts, and the 
frequency of crime and violence. Source: Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, World Bank. 
GDP per capita GDP per capita in USD. Source: World Development Indicators, 
World Bank. 
Inflation Consumer Price index growth rate. Source: World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
 
 
